

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Rec'd: NOVEMBER 15, 1958  
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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1794, NOVEMBER 15, 4 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1794 REPEATED INFORMATION BERLIN 19  
BONN 141 LONDON 334 MOSCOW 79

RE DEPTTEL 1743; EMBTEL 1787.

1. AS INDICATED EMBTEL 1787 DARIDAN HAS TOLD US FR RPT ER  
PREPARED ISSUE STRONG JOINT STATEMENT ON BERLIN SITUATION,  
SUBJECT TO GER ACQUIESCENCE. WORKING LEVEL AT FONOFF,  
HOWEVER, (LALOY, JURGENSEN, CONTINUES FEEL THAT, FROM  
TACTICAL POINT OF VIEW, PUBLIC TRIPARTITE STATEMENT WOULD  
PROBABLY BE INADVISABLE AT PRESENT JUNCTURE. THEY NOTE  
ALL THREE CAPITALS HAVE ALREADY TAKEN FIRM PUBLIC POSITION  
ON KHRUSHCHEV'S THREATS AND THEY ARE INCLINED BELIEVE  
THAT TRIPARTITE STATEMENT WOULD APPEAR REPETITIOUS AS  
WELL AS NEEDLESSLY PROVOCATIVE AT MOMENT WHEN CRISIS ATMOSPHERE  
APPEARS HAVE RECEDED SOMEWHAT. JURGENSEN EXPRESSED  
TO US YESTERDAY VIEW THAT, IF JOINT ACTION TO BE TAKEN  
VIS-A-VIS SOVS, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE DO SO THROUGH  
CONFIDENTIAL, CONCERTED APPROACHES BY AMBS IN MOSCOW.  
HE ALSO THOUGHT IDEA OF PUBLIC TRIPARTITE STATEMENT COULD  
BE HELD IN ABEYANCE FOR POSSIBLE USE AT LATER TIME.

2. WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE STATEMENT BY SECY OR PRESIDENT  
CONCERNING BERLIN, JURGENSEN FELT THIS WOULD BE EXCELLENT,  
BUT STATED EMPHATICALLY FR WOULD APPRECIATE BEING CONSULTED  
IN ADVANCE RE SUCH STATEMENT. JURGENSEN POINTED OUT THAT  
DE GAULLE'S INTEREST IN TRIPARTITE CONSULTATION OBVIOUSLY  
MADE SUCH ACTION ADVISABLE.

3. RE POSSIBILITY OF BERLIN AIRLIFT, JURGENSEN SAID  
FR RECENTLY

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762.0221/11-1558

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-2- 1794 NOVEMBER 15, 4 PM, FROM PARIS

FR RECENTLY RECEIVED REVISED PLANS FOR ALLIED AIRLIFT, WHICH AT FIRST GLANCE SEEMED SATISFACTORY TO FONOFF. HE NOTED "PRESSURE NOW ON" TO OBTAIN OFFICIAL FR GOVT APPROVAL THESE PLANS. JURGENSEN SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR FR TO FIND VERY MANY TRANSPORT PLANES FOR BERLIN (BULK OF FR AIRCRAFT BEING TIED UP IN ALGERIA), FR WOULD WISH PARTICIPATE IN GREATER MEASURE THAN IN 1948 IF NEW AIRLIFT BECOMES NECESSARY.

4. FONOFF HAS SHOWN US INSTRUCTION TO FR PERMREP NAC FOR DISCUSSION IN NAC NOV 17 ON BERLIN. INSTRUCTIONS NOT RPT NOT YET APPROVED BY COUVE BUT ARE EXPECTED BE CLEARED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. INSTRUCTIONS RECAPITULATE FR VIEWS OUTLINED IN FONOFF BACKGROUND STATEMENT (EMBTel 1750) RE BASIS OF FR PRESENCE IN BERLIN, AND STRESS DESIRABILITY OF STRONGEST POSSIBLE UNITY ON BERLIN, NOT RPT NOT ONLY AMONG THREE POWERS DIRECTLY CONCERNED BUT ON PART ALL NATO MEMBERS. FR EXPECT THAT GERS AND US WILL TAKE LEAD IN NAC DISCUSSION, BUT FR REP IS INSTRUCTED GIVE THEM STRONG SUPPORT.

5. WORKING LEVEL OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED VIEW, ALSO REFLECTED IN INSTRUCTIONS TO FR NAC REP, THAT THERE IS "DIVISION OF LABOR" BETWEEN SOVS AND GDR RE BERLIN AND GER SITUATION. SOVS, ACCORDING THIS THEORY, ARE TO CONCENTRATE ON BERLIN AND QUADRIPARTITE STATUS, ETC., WHILE GDR REPS WILL CONCENTRATE ON OVERALL QUESTION, PEACE TREATY, AND SOON.

FR BELIEVE THIS MAY BE EXPLANATION OF ALLEGED "DISCREPANCY" BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV'S TOUGH LINE ON BERLIN AND FAILURE OF GROTEWOHL TO PRESS BERLIN QUESTION,

LYON

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